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THE NEGLECTED NINTH
AMENDMENT: THE "OTHER RIGHTS"
RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE
Luis KUTNER*
The year 1787 was the biggest year in the history of the United
States, because it was pre-eminently a year of political creation. It was
a year for political heroes, for men who could distinguish the possible
from the impossible and then convert the boldest of possibilities into
the most solid of realities.
The Founding Fathers, the Men of Philadelphia, made the Grand
Convention a remarkable arena for creating unity of the delegates,
despite sharp differences of opinion on some issues. All the delegates
were patriots, Whigs, republicans, and men with Lockean views of
property. All but two or three were nationalists who recognized the
need for a new departure. The Convention, for all its innate dignity
and regard for form, operated as a large committee rather than a
small assembly. The objectives of the delegates were closely linked
with the public good: an end to disorder, a forestalling of despotism,
protection for liberty, security for property, honor for the Republic.
These were the men who had pledged their lives, their fortunes,
and their sacred honor to a revolution in the name of republicanism,
a form of government that seemed far more radical and experimental
at that time than it does today. At the same time, they were not
cloistered doctrinaires, but men of practical experience; the majority
were planters and large scale farmers and merchants and state officials.
The Constitution, as it finally emerged, was a pleasing balance of
reason and practical experience, with a series of compromises between
large and small states, between North and South, between liberty and
restraints on its abuse. Some issues that were to prove disruptive later
-slavery and the right of states to withdraw from the Union-were
passed over as impossibly disruptive.
But on balance, the men of Philadelphia built soundly and deserved
well of their country. It is of interest to note that another body with
the same name, Convention, came into existence during the stormiest
period of the French Revolution. Its members indulged in prodigious
feats of oratory. It was purged under the pressure of bloodthirsty mobs;
* Member, Illinois Bar, Indiana Bar; University of Chicago; Chairman, Com-
mission for International Due Process of Law; former visiting Associate
Professor, Yale Law School; Chairman, World Habeas Corpus Committee,
World Peace Through Law Center; formal Counsul for Ecuador; former
Counsul General for Guatemala; former Special Counsel to the Attorney
General of Illinois; Special United States Master in Chancery; author of
numerous law journal articles and several books, including World Habeas
Corpus and I, The Lawyer.
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many of its members perished on the guillotine, and it passed into his-
tory without leaving any permanent imprint on French political in-
stitutions.
The Convention, however, meeting in the staid atmosphere of
Quaker Philadelphia, conducted its discussions in private with no
threat of mob violence or military pressure, produced a Charter of
government that has been amended-(even though the conditions of
amendment were properly made difficult but not impossible)-and
sometimes bent and twisted, but it still stands as a subject of cherished
respect and affection and unfailingly seems to respond to resolving the
ever changing interest of national unity.
It is an historical commentary that, when the completed document
of the Constitution was forwarded from Madison to Jefferson, then
Ambassador to France, it contained no Bill of Rights. To this Jefferson
objected. In the Convention itself, this lack aroused most unfavorable
comment. In the several Conventions calling for ratification, the failure
to include in the body of the instrument, the immemorial rights and
privileges of free men-freedom of speech, of the press, of religion, of
assembly, of petition, immunity from unlawful seizure, trial by jury,
security of life, person, and property, and the like-had given force to
the arguments of men, like George Mason and Patrick Henry, against
acceptance. These men, and others, had suggested that another conven-
tion be called for correcting this and similar omissions. North Carolina
had adopted a resolution virtually declaring its refusal to ratify until
this Bill of Rights should be added. There was no hostility in the Phila-
delphia Convention or outside it to make these historic immunities part
of the American system.
Since most of the state constitutions contained a bill of rights, it was,
therefore, argued-why load down the organ of the central government
with similar declarations. Those who fought for the Bill of Rights to
include civil rights believed that the failure to repeat the guaranties in
the Constitution masked a deep-laid plot against public liberties. Since
the omission of the Bill of Rights gave a handle to the enemies, Madi-
son and other practical statesmen believed that amendments, in ac-
co'-dance with the program set forth in Article V, should be added in-
corporating all the privileges obtained by Englishmen at Runnymede
and wrung from the Crown in succeeding centuries; and within short
of two years after the United States Government had been recognized,
the first ten Articles of Amendment were added to the Constitution.
The civil rights and liberties specifically protected by the United
States Constitution were enumerated in the first eight amendments, the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Amendments, Ar-
ticle 1: Section 9, Clauses 2 and 3, and Section 10, Clause 1; and Ar-
ticle 4; Sections 2 and 4. The enumerated rights are specified in the
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first eight amendments. However, the first nine amendments, which
constitute the Bill of Rights, were added in 1791 within two years after
ratification by the required number of states as a result of widespread
feeling that the Federal Constitution, as drafted in 1787, unlike the
majority of state constitutions, insufficiently guaranteed individual lib-
erties. They guarantee (First Amendment) the freedom of worship,
of speech, of the press, of assembly, and of petition to the government
for redress of grievances; (Second Amendment) the right to bear
arms-adopted with reference to state militias; (Third Amendment)
freedom from the quartering of soldiers without the consent of the
owner of the house; and (Fourth Amendment) freedom from search
except with warrant. They further guarantee (Fifth Amendment) that
no person shall be held for an infamous crime without indictment, be
twice put in "jeopardy of life or limb" for the same offense, be com-
pelled to testify against himself, or "be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law" and establish that private proper-
ty may not be taken for public use without just compensation. The
Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of a speedy and public trial by
an impartial jury in all criminal prosecutions, while the Seventh
Amendment guarantees the right of trial by jury in all common-law
suits "where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,"
and the Eighth Amendment prohibits excessive bail and fines and
"cruel and unusual" punishment. By the Tenth Amendment, generally
considered with the first nine (they all went into effect in 1791), "the
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people." Powers reserved to the States are often termed "residual
powers."
The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, adopted
after the Civil War, prohibit slavery and involuntary servitude; pro-
tect the individual from state abridgement of his privileges and im-
munities as citizens of the United States and from state deprivations
of his life, liberty, or property without "due process of law" or the
equal protection of the laws; and protect the right to vote. The Nine-
teenth Amendment, adopted after World War I, grants the right to
vote to women.
In the body of the Constitution, the Congress is prohibited from
suspending the Writ of Habeas Corpus except in cases of rebellion or
invasion or when the public safety may require it and from enacting
Bills of Attainder or ex post facto laws by virtue of Article I: Section
9, Clauses 2 and 3. The States are likewise prohibited from enacting
a Bill of Attainder** or ex post facto law and are prohibited from
** A bill declaring persons attainted and their property confiscated. The chief
consequences of attainder were forfeiture of the criminal's property; cor-
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passing any law impairing the obligation of contract under Section 10,
Clause 1 of Article 1. Article 4, Sections 2 and 4, provides that the
citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immuni-
ties of the citizens of the several States, and that the United States
guarantee each and every State a republican form of government.
In addition to the civil rights and liberties which are embodied in
the Constitution, the Ninth Amendment provides:
"The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage other rights retained by
the people."
The wording of this amendment apparently indicates that the rights
enumerated in the body of the Constitution and the amendments do not
preclude claims of other rights which the individual may assert.
This article will briefly review the historical background regarding
the adoption and application of the Ninth Amendment, analyze its ap-
plication in Griswold v. Connecticut,' and consider what are the "other
rights" not enumerated which may be claimed by the individual.
I. The Historical Background and Application
of the Ninth Amendment
The first Bill of Rights had been adopted by the Commonwealth
of Virginia; but the United States Constitution, when adopted at the
Philadelphia Convention, did not contain a Bill of Rights. The framers
had regarded the Constitution as merely delegating certain limited
powers to the Federal Government and that there was no need to en-
compass a Bill of Rights protecting the individual from governmental
action. The occasions in which the Federal Government would act
upon the individual was deemed to be rare. But this notion was con-
tradicted by the inclusion of provisions for the Writ of Habeas Corpus
and the prohibition of Bills of Attainder and ex post facto laws. Strong
opposition was encountered in ratifying the Constitution by the States.
The critics of the Constitution argued that it contained no provisions
protecting the individual from possible infringements by Federal au-
thority.
To obtain necessary support for the ratification of the Constitution,
Madison promised that, upon ratification, the first business of the new
Congress would be to submit a Bill of Rights for ratification. However,
an argument made by Hamilton in opposition to the inclusion of a
Bill of Rights was that the enumeration of the protection of certain
rights would preclude protection of other rights. Madison was con-
cerned that the formulation of the protection of specific rights would
ruption of his blood, so that no title could be traced through him; and in-
capacity to sue. This extinction of rights which resulted from a sentence of
death or outlawing for treason or felony was abolished in 1870.
'381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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be too limited. He was particularly concerned about the extent to which
freedom of conscience would be protected. To meet these problems,
the Ninth Amendment was adopted. 2
As originally formulated, the Ninth Amendment was coupled in
one article with the Tenth Amendment which asserted that "the powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor prohibited
by it to the people, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." Subsequently, the two amendments were separated. However,
this legislative history may indicate that it was the intent of the framers
to make the Ninth Amendment applicable to the States as well as to
the Federal Government.3
The framers, in adopting the Constitution and the Bill of Rights,
were influenced by the philosophy of John Locke. His notion of in-
herent human rights (not excluding Jean Jacques Rousseau and others)
influenced the writing of the Declaration of Independence. Government
comprised a "social contract" deriving its source from the governed.
The source of individual rights did not emanate from the government
but from the people. The Bill of Rights did not confer rights upon the
people but reaffirmed pre-existing rights. 4 This notion is reflected in
the phrasing of the Ninth Amendment which refers to "rights . . .
retained by the people." This was a reflection of the natural law no-
tions of the Enlightenment. The Ninth Amendment has been interpreted
to constitute a basic statement of individualism, recognizing the in-
herent right of the individual.5
The Ninth Amendment and the Bill of Rights are also reflections
of the notions of the Encyclopediaists' opposition to the arbitrary rule
of feudalism and the subsequent monarchical absolutism. The custom
of the Enlightenment, which has been carried over to the present day,
was the formulation of individual rights. But simultaneously, there was
a reaction against the particularism and narrow formulation of legal
rules.6 The Ninth Amendment was intended to assert that the con-
stitutional formulations were not to be narrowly interpreted. As Mr.
Justice Storey stated:
This clause was manifestly introduced to prevent any perverse
or ingenious misapplication of the well known maxim, that an
affirmation in particular cases implies a negation in all others;
and, e converso, that a negation in particular cases implies an
affirmation in all others. The maxim, rightly understood, is per-
2 The history of the adoption of the ninth amendment is discussed in PATTER-
SON, THE FORGOTTEN AMENDMENT (Bobbs-Merrill, 1951); Note, The Un-
certain Renaissance of the Ninth Amendment, 33 U. CH. L. REv. 814 (1966).
3 Redlich, Are There Certain Rights . . . Retained by the People?, 37 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 787 (1962).
4 Patterson, supra.
Franklin, The Relation of the Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the Third Constitution, 4 How. L. J. 170 (1958).6 Ibid.
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fectly sound and safe; but it has often been strangely forced from
its natural meaning into the support of the most dangerous po-
litical heresies.
7
Madison, in framing the Bill of Rights and the Ninth Amendment,
did not intend to limit the powers of the Federal Government. The
"necessary and proper" clause conferred authority on the Congress to
exercise its powers in any way it may deem proper and necessary. But
the Congress could not exercise its powers in a manner which would
infringe upon individual rights. The Congress has the power to lay
and collect taxes, but it cannot use the "necessary and proper" clause
to issue general warrants for tax collecting." Similarly, the Ninth
Amendment, in recognizing that there are inherent rights retained by
the people, does not limit the power of the Federal Government but
asserts that the Government may not exercise its powers in a manner
which will deprive the individual of his inherent rights.
This principle was not, however, recognized by Mr. Justice Reed
in United Public Workers v. Mitchell9 where the Ninth Amendment
was asserted to challenge the constitutionality of the Hatch Act which
declared unlawful certain specified political activities of federal em-
ployees. Justice Reed based his decision on the power of the Federal
Government to regulate the activities of its employees, though recog-
nizing the existence of an inherent right.
Prior to Griswold, the Supreme Court has had little occasion to
apply the Ninth Amendment. In Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Ten-
ncssee Valley Authority,'0 the contention that the sale of e'ectricity by
the Tennessee Valley Authority violated the Ninth Amendment by
putting Federal authority in competition with privately owned interests
and by depriving the people of the States of the rights to acquire prop-
erty and to employ it in a lawful business was overruled. The Court
had previously denied a contention that this amendment prohibited
Congress from disposing of electric power as property of the United
States." But aside from these cases and the M1fitchell opinion, the Court
had not construed the Ninth Amendment.
Actually, the Court had been invoking what may be regarded as the
unenunierated rights by reference to the "contract" clause in the early
years of the Republic 2 and, following the Civil War, by reference to
7 STOREY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 651(5th ed., 1891), quoted by Mr. Justice Goldberg in Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 490, and contra by Mr. Justice Black, id., 520 footnote 15. Similar
comments were made by MADISON, 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 440 (Gales and
Seaton, 3d., 1884).
8 Note, The Uncertain Renaissance of the Ninth Amendment, supra.
9330 U.S. 75 (1947).
10306 U.S. 118 (1939).
1 Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
12 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87 (1810) ; Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S.,
(9 Cranch.) 43 (1815).
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the "due process" and "equal protection" clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment.13
Chief Justice Marshall, in Barron v. Baltimore,14 had held that the
Bill of Rights did not apply to the States. Mr. Justice Miller, in
Eillenbecker v. The District Court of Plymouth County, Iowa," held that
only the first eight amendments had reference to the powers exercised
by the Government of the United States and not to those of the States,
a principle which was later reiterated by Mr. Justice Cardozo in Palko
v. Connecticitt.'6 These cases indicate that a distinction was made by
the Court between the enumerated rights of the first eight amendments
and the Ninth. The Court was not bound to any construction of the
Ninth Amendment which would limit its application to the Federal
Government alone.
After 1937, the Court began to limit the application of the Four-
teenth Amendment's "due process" and "equal protection" clauses. The
judiciary no longer inquired as to the rational basis for substantive
economic regulation deferring to the discretion of the legislature.' 7 The
tendency developed to limit the "due process" clause to the application
of enumerated rights. The trend has developed to use the Fourteenth
Amendment to incorporate or absorb the rights enumerated in the first
eight amendments into the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth to
be applied to the States.'" The "due process" clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment had rarely been invoked and was limited in scope.'9 A new in-
terest then developed in the use of the Ninth Amendment, as exempli-
fied by the appearance of a monograph, The Forgotten Ninth Amend-
ment, by Bennett B. Patterson of the Texas Bar.2 0
A judicial attitude to the Ninth Amendment was expressed by Mr.
Justice Jackson in referring to Patterson's book:
I could not remember that in my long experience in government
litigation I had ever had an argument based on the Ninth
Amendment or that I had ever been obliged to meet one based
thereon, and I could not recall ever having heard that Amend-
ment mentioned by any Justice of the Court in Conference or
'3 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S.
161 (1908); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adams v. Tanner, 244
U.S. 590 (1917). These cases are discussed generally in Corwin, LIBERTY
AGA NST GovERNMENT (1948).
1432 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
"5 134 U.S. 31 (1890)).
16 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
17Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Olson v. Nebraska, 313 U.S.(1941); Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co.,
335 U.S. 525 (1949); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106(1949).
18Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643(1961); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S.
609 (1965) ; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
19 Redlich, supra.
20 Note 2, supra.
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by any lawyer in any argument before it. So I turned to the
work of my friends Hart and Wechsler, "The Federal Courts
and the Federal System," and found that they omitted the
Ninth Amendment entirely from their printing of the important
excerpts from the Constitution. Going to the full text, however,
I found that it reads: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people." What are these other rights retained by
the people? To what law shall we look for their source and
definition? My lawyer friend kindly furnished me all the legis-
lative history he had been able to find on the subject and called
my attention to the only written commentary on it. But the Ninth
Amendment rights which are not to be disturbed by the Federal
Government are still a mystery to me. 1
II. Griswold v. Connecticut
The Court for the first time construed the Ninth Amendment in
Griswold v. Connecticut,2 2 which involved a challenge to the constitu-
tionality of a Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of contraceptive
drugs or devices by married couples and the prescribing of such drugs
or devices. A director and attending physician of a birth control clinic
were convicted and fined. After their convictions were upheld by the
higher courts of Connecticut, the defendants petitioned for certiorari
to the Supreme Court of the United States. Mr. Justice Douglas, in
writing the Opinion of the Court, deduced a constitutionally protected
right of privacy as implicit within the "penumbra" of the enumerated
rights.
[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that give them
life and substance. . . .Various guarantees create zones of pri-
vacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the
First Amendment is one .... The Third Amendment in its pro-
hibition against the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time
of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of
that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the
"right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."
The Fifth Amendment in its self-incrimination Clause enables
the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may
not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amend-
ment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others re-
tained by the people. '2 3
Douglas is unclear as to the relevance of the Ninth Amendment.
But in his dissent in Osborn v. United States he refers to his opinion
in Griswold and quotes from a law review student note:
2 1JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT,
74-75 (Harper Torch Books, 1963).
22 Supra, Note 1.
23381 U.S. at 484.
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The ninth amendment should be permitted to occupy its rightful
place in the Constitution as a reminder at the end of the Bill
of Rights that there exist rights other than those set out in the
first eight amendments. It was intended to preserve the under-
lying theory of the Constitutional Convention that individual
rights exist independently of government and to negate the Fed-
eralist argument that the enumeration of certain rights would
imply the forfeiture of all others. The ninth is simply a rule of
construction, applicable to the entire constitution.2 4
Apparently Douglas construes the Ninth Amendment to permit the
application of a rule of construction which would enable the judge to
derive unenumerated rights as based upon values implicit within the
context of the specified rights. He regards it as a rule of construction.
Mr. Justice Goldberg, in his concurring opinion in Griswold,2 also
applied the Ninth Amendment as a rule of construction. He asserted
that the Constitution does not permit the infringement of the right of
privacy in marriage merely because the right is not specifically guaran-
teed in the first eight amendments. He does not construe the Ninth
Amendment as constituting an independent source for rights protected
from infringement by either the States or the Federal Government.
"Rather, the Ninth Amendment shows a belief of the Constitution's
authors that fundamental rights exist that are not expressly enumerated
in the first eight amendments and an intent that the list of rights in-
cluded there not be deemed exhausted." 8 Though this amendment and
the entire Bill of Rights originally concerned restrictions upon Federal
power, the subsequently enacted Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
States as well as the Federal Government from abridging fundamental
personal freedoms. The Ninth Amendment is used with the "due
process" clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. "In sum,
the Ninth Amendment simply lends strong support to the view that
the 'liberty' protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments from
infringement by the Federal Government or the States is not restricted
to rights specifically mentioned in the first eight amendments. ' 27 Judges
must look to the "'traditions and (collective) conscience of our people'
to determine whether a principle is 'so rooted (there) as to be ranked
as fundamental.' ",28 Goldberg then determined that the right of privacy
is a fundamental personal right emanating from the totality of the
constitutional scheme and cited prior judicial decisions invoking the
Fourteenth Amendment as instances of judicial recognition of the
privacy of the home and of family life.
24Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 352-3 (1966), footnote 15, quoting
from Note, The Uncertain Renaissance of the Ninth Amendment, 33 U. CI.
L. REv. 814, 835 (1966).
25 381 U.S. at 487.
2G Id. at 492.




Clearly, Goldberg holds that by virtue of the Ninth Amendment the
Court is not limited by the first eight amendments in upholding funda-
mental personal rights both in regard to limitations upon Federal and-
through the Fourteenth Amendment-State authority. The Court de-
termines what rights are fundamental by referring to the constitutional
scheme and the collective conscience of the people.
One such fundamental personal right is the right of privacy in
marriage, which is encroached upon by the Connecticut statute. The
ban on the use of contraceptives by married persons cannot be justified
as serving any subordinate state interest which is compelling or nec-
essary. This holding does not broaden the powers of the Court, Gold-
berg reasons, because it had previously upheld rights not specified by
the wording of the Constitution, including the privacy of family rela-
tionships; and the Ninth Amendment confirms the use of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments' "due process" clauses in this manner. Though
the States are free to engage in economic and social experimentation,
they may not encroach upon fundamental personal rights.
One commentator has characterized Goldberg's approach as a
natural law conception of the Ninth Amendment similar to the Volks-
geist German Historical School of Savigny. While Douglas offers legal
method "which is opposed to arbitrariness because it is grounded in
analogy justified by the texts of the first eight amendments of the ...
Constitution," Goldberg "offers legal method which is arbitrary be-
cause the sources of determination may be entirely arbitrary and secre-
tive."2 The allegation is made that "Justice Goldberg offers legal
method which is arbitrary because the sources of determination may
be entirely subjective and secretive. ' 30 The methodo!ogy "strengthens
the position not of democratic social forces, but that of American
monopolistic possessive market society, which similarly once exploitel
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment." 3' In contrast,
Douglas' approach is characterized as that of using the Ninth Amend-
ment to fill gaps or lacunae in the first eight amendments by analogy
as is done in the Roman law tradition.
However, even the phrasing of the first eight amendments is so
broad as to be construed only by subjective judgment. The use of
analogy also depends on the judge's personal predilections. Moreover,
the concept of a right of privacy is of such breadth as to encompass
a great number of personal infringements depending upon the judge's
subjective notions. Privacy may, to a large extent, be viewed as a
cultural norm which has been introduced into a variety of legal issues
29 Franklin, The Ninth Awmendment as Civil Law Method and Its Implicationsfor Republican Form of Government: Griswold v. Connecticut; South Caro-
lina v. Katzenbach, 40 TULANE L. REv. 487 (1966).
30 Id. at 489.
31 Ibid.
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and providing a rallying point for those concerned about the encroach-
ments of mass society on the individual. Its utility is much like that
of "due process" or "equal protection." 32
Mr. Justice Harlan wrote a concurring opinion deriving a right of
privacy in the family relationship from the "due process" clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment standing "on its own bottom" 33 and based
on notions of ordered liberty. Mr. Justice White argued that though
the Court will not intervene in matters involving economic regulation,
more judicial concern will be manifested where regulation affects cer-
tain sensitive areas, including the family relationship. These justices,
not having limited the Fourteenth Amendment's "due process" clause
to the absorption or incorporation of the first eight amendments, found
it unnecessary to invoke the Ninth Amendment.
Justices Stewart and Black dissented. Mr. Justice Stewart regarded
Goldberg's reliance on the Ninth Amendment as "turn[ing] sommer-
saults with history."34 To Stewart the Ninth Amendment, like the
Tenth, which the Court has characterized as stating "but a truism
that all is retained which has not been surrendered," was adopted to
make clear that the adoption of the Bill of Rights "did not alter the
plan that the Federal Government was to be a government of express
and limited powers, and that all rights and powers not delegated to
it were retained by the people and the individual states." 35
Dean Roscoe Pound would apparently support this interpretation:
Where rights are defined and secured expressly by the Con-
stitution, there is simply a question of interpretation. But where
rights not declared in terms are "reserved" there is a question
as to where is the power of defining them, and where is the
power of securing them when defined. The Tenth Amendment
seems to preclude definition and enforcement by the federal gov-
ernment except as committed to that government by the Con-
stitution. It would seem, therefore, that these reserved rights
may be defined and enforcement of them may be provided by
the states, except as may be precluded by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, or may be defined and acquired secured enforcement by
the people of the United States by constitutional amendment.
Assuming that the Ninth Amendment is a general recognition
of inherent or natural rights, it does not purport to secure them.
• . . It declares that there are natural rights but makes no at-
tempt to define those not expressly provided for in the Bill of
Rights nor to provide for securing them. But the states have the
attributes and powers of sovereignty so far as inherent rights are
not committed to the federal government, defining and securing
33 Havighurst, Foreward, 31 LAw AND CONTEMP. PROBs. 252 (1966).
33381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965).




them is left to the states or to be taken over by the people of the
United States by constitutional amendment .... 36
However, though the Ninth Amendment was at one time coupled
with the Tenth, the two were separated. The wording and history of
the Ninth Amendment suggested that the intention was to express a
principle of construction, that because certain rights are not enumerated
in the Constitution this does not preclude their protection. With the
establishment of the principle of judicial review, the Supreme Court
should not be precluded from protecting a right-such as, the right of
privacy in regard to the marital relationship-merely because it is not
specified in the Constitution. The framers, in drafting the Ninth Amend-
ment, sought to avoid the argument of Stewart that, because there is
no specific constitutional provision protecting the rights involved in
Griswold, these rights could not be protected.
Mr. justice Black, like Stewart, is unable to hold the Connecticut
statute unconstitutional because no specific Constitutional right is in-
fringed. He is particularly critical of Goldberg's use of the Ninth
Amendment which, like Harlan's and White's use of the Fourteenth
Amendment's "due process" clause, constitutes an extension of judicial
authority. The Court should not substitute its own judgment for that
of the legislature. In using the Ninth Amendment the Court, contrary
to Goldberg's contention, will not be able to avoid basing decisions on
their personal and private notions. There is no means for determining
the "traditional and collective conscience of our people." He contends
that the Ninth Amendment was intended only to limit the Federal Gov-
ernment to the powers granted expressly or by necessary implication.
For the Court to invoke the Ninth Amendment "would make of this
Court's members a day to day constitutional convention. 3
7
Black charges that his concurring brethren are returning to the old
line of substantive natural law due process cases. He quotes at length
from his dissent in Adamson v. California'3 where he had argued that
the Fourteenth Amendment "due process" clause incorporates the Bill
of Rights by reasoning that, in construing the Bill of Rights and other
specific Constitutional provisions, the courts "proceed within clearly
marked constitutional boundaries seek to execute policies written into
the Constitution,"39 while in relying on natural law notions of due
process "they roam at will in the limitless area of their own beliefs as
to reasonableness and actually select policies, a responsibility which
the Constitution entrusts to the legislative representatives of the
people. 40
36 Pound, "Foreward" to Patterson, sutpra, vi.
37 381 U.S. 479, 522 (1965).
3S 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
39381 U.S. 479, 525 (1965).
40 Id.
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Black's contention, however, that the Ninth Amendment is merely
a limitation on the Federal Government is contradicted by his claim
that the Fourteenth Amendment's "due process" clause had made the
Bill of Rights applicable to the states. In Adamson v. California,41 he
refers to the "First Ten Amendments" as binding on the states, thus
including the Ninth, and urged extending to all the people the complete
protection of the Bill of Rights. In Griswold, he fails to present any
convincing historical reasons as to why the Ninth Amendment should
be construed differently from any other constitutional provision.
Black's approach is based on an antipathy to subjective judicial
interpretation. But the specific provisions are also dependent on sub-
jective interpretation. Though he bases his "absolutist" interpretation
of the First Amendment on what he regards as its plain meaning, while
admitting that this coincides with his policy beliefs, analysis indicates
uncertainty as to the meaning of "speech" and "abridge," 42 nor is it
apparent that his interpretation necessarily coincides with the inter-
pretation of the framers.4 3 The Eighth Amendment provision as to
"cruel and unusual punishment" has been subject to broad interpreta-
tion based on the judge's personal predilections.44 The text of the Con-
stitution "can serve only as the putative starting point of constitutional
review, not as both its certain beginning and its unequivocal end. '4 5
Because problems arise which the framers had not anticipated and
because their intent cannot be conclusively determined, subjective ju-
dicial determination is unavoidable. The Constitution does not provide
specific answers.
Regardless of whether the judicial formula proposed by Douglas,
Goldberg, or Black is adopted, decisions will be based on the judge's
bias. This is particularly true regarding the formulae for applying the
Ninth Amendment. To attempt to establish objective guidelines for
determining the enumerated rights is illusory.46 But to fear the return
to judicial intervention in economic and social regulation is ground-
less. The role of the State in controlling economic and social life is
generally accepted.
The Eisenhower Republican administration did not lead to the ap-
pointment of justices who sought to return in any manner to the pre-
1937 doctrines; and the overwhelming defeat of the Republican candi-
date in 1964, who called for the appointment of judges with a different
philosophy, meant the final repudiation of these notions. The use of
41332 U.S. 46 (1947).
42 Cahn, Mr. Justice Black and the First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public
Interview, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 549 (1962).
43 LEvy, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (Harper, 1962).
44 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
45 BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUs BRANCH, 141 (1963).




the Ninth Amendment should not lead to fears of extension of judicial
power. Universally unpopular decisions will not be enforced, and the
Congress has the power to limit the scope of judicial review.17 More-
over, the justices are subject to criticism regarding the rationale of
their decisions by their peers as expressed in scholarly journals. Even
a Supreme Court justice is limited by the disciplines of the legal
tradition.
Though the Court has continued to refrain from invoking the due
process and equal protection clauses to determine the rationality of
economic and social legislation, it has not refrained from determining
the purpose of legislation where fundamental human rights are in-
volved. The Court has been particularly concerned about legislation
infringing upon the free speech provisions of the First Amendment.
Where the question is whether legislation is "necessary and proper"
to the accomplishment of a constitutionally permitted legislative pur-
pose, or whether a particular enactment is "appropriate legislation,"
the so-called rational basis test is properly invoked to give the legisla-
ture-federal or state-maximum freedom to promote the public wel-
fare in the face of a claimed violation of due process. But the rational
basis test is particularly inappropriate where First Amendment rights
are involved.
48
The basis for this distinction is that political rights are involved,
the right of political participation. 49 The same justification applies with
regard to the application of the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment in eliminating racial segregation and legislative
malapportionment. However, the Court has interfered with economic
regulation where the effect is taking of property.50 The approach of the
Court is that of protecting the individual where hard core individual
rights are involved.5 1 Such rights are essential for the functioning of a
free, democratic society. The Ninth Amendment could be employed
where such fundamental rights are not enumerated.
III. The "Other" Rights Retained by the People
The Ninth Amendment may be regarded as a rule of construction
applicable to the entire Constitution. As a guide placed at the end of
the Bill of Rights, it enables the Court to recognize the existence of
rights not specified or enumerated. The Ninth Amendment is not a
47 Ex Parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 508 (1869).
48 Note, The Julian Bond Case, 52 VA. L. REV., 1309, 1331 (1966).
4 Hyman and Newhouse, Standards for Preferred Freedoms beyond the First,
60 N.U.L. R. 1 (1965).
50 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (opinion by Mr. Justice
Holmes); Miller v. Schone, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); United States v. Causby,
328 U.S. 256 (1946) ; Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962) ; Lock-
hart, Kamisar and Chopter, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, QUES-
TIONS, 613 ff. (West, 1964).51 Hyman and Newhouse, supra.
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source of these unenumerated rights but points to other parts of the
Constitution, particularly the "due process" clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments as the context within which enumerated rights
are to be determined and the means by which they are to be protected .
2
However, in construing the Ninth Amendment, the Court will base its
rationale within the context of present day thinking as derived from
precedents in other cases. As the Court is not bound to notions of
equality as set forth in a particular political era,53 it is similarly not
bound in regard to other constitutional provisions. Mr. Justice Holmes
observed:
[W]hen we are dealing with words that also are a con-
stituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must
realize that they have called into life a being the development
of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most
gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to realize or to
hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a century
and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to prove
that they created a nation. The case before us must be considered
in the light of our whole experience and not merely in that of
what was said a hundred years ago.5"
Within this context it is necessary to determine what are the rights
retained by the people under the Ninth Amendment. Griswold recog-
nizes the right of privacy. This right includes the family or marital
relations encompassing the right to bear and rear children and to en-
gage in sexual relations.55 The State may not interfere with the par-
ental right to teach a child a foreign language,58 to compel attendance
only at a public school,57 or to make saluting the flag compulsory.-'s
However, this right of privacy is not absolute, as the State may
compel vaccination and forbid child labor.59 The approach the Court
will choose to take will depend upon the nature of the public interest
to be protected, the nature and extent to which individual rights are
infringed upon, and the availability of alternative approaches to achiev-
ing the purpose of the legislation. 0
Family privacy is peculiarly subject to infringement in the dis-
pensing and administration of public assistance. Case workers, by
threatening to deprive parents of the custody of their children or by
52 Note, supra, Note 8.
53 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
54 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920). A similar view is held by Mr.
Justice Fortas in his dissenting opinion on Fortson v. forris, 385 U.S. 231,
241 (1967).
55 Griswold v. Connecticut, supra; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
56 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
57 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
58 Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
59 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11 (1905).




denial of welfare payments, direct the private lives of their clients. The
practice of mass night and pre-dawn searches to determine the pres-
ence of a man in the house is a flagrant intrusion of family privacy.
However, also involved in this area are policy considerations as to the
efficiency of dispensing grants, the means test, and the need for re-
habilitation to make the families self-sufficient. 62 But protection must
be given from arbitrary infringement with individual rights as charac-
terized by mass searches. Similar considerations are involved with
regard to the treatment of juvenile delinquents.6
Another area of family privacy involves the miscegnation statutes
prohibiting the marriage or cohabitation of couples who are members
of different races. Though such statutes may be held to be uncon-
stitutional as a denial of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment 6 4 an alternative basis could be the right to family privacy.
The right of privacy recognized in Griswold, as premised in the
ninth amendment, should embody the doctor-patient relationship. 6
Though the State may regulate the qualifications of those who are to
be licensed to practice medicine, the State may not unduly restrict the
type of treatment he may prescribe for his patient. Laws which forbid
the prescribing of contraceptives to unmarried women by the physician
may constitute an infringement of the doctor-patient relationship.
Where governmental authorities interfere with the physician's right to
prescribe such nontoxic, harmless drugs as Krebiozen for the treat-
ment of terminal cancer, a similar infringement may be deemed to have
occurred.
Griswold is significant in that for the first time the Court upheld
the right of privacy without the presence of a physical intrusion. Previ-
ously, the Court has refused to apply the search and seizure provisions
of the Fourth Amendment in cases involving wiretapping or eaves-
dropping absent an actual breaking or entering of the premises. 6 But
the recognition of an independent right of privacy may mean that the
61 Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare, 74 YALE L. J. 1245 (1965).
62 Handler and Rosenheim, Privacy in Welfare: Public Assistance and Juvenile
Justice, 31 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 377 (1966).
63 Ibid.
64 Wadlington, The Loving Case: Virginia's Anti-Miscegenation Statute in His-
torical Perspective, 52 VA. L. REv. 1189 (1966). The argument that the
Fourteenth Amendment is inapplicable is presented by Avins, Anti-Mis-
cegenation Laws and the Fourteenth Anendment: The Original Intent, id.
at 1224. The Supreme Court, in Loving v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 87 Sup.
Ct. 1817 (1967) held unconstitutional a Virginia statute banning interracial
marriages as violative of the equal protection and due process clauses of the
fourteenth amendment.
62 Note, What Does Griswold Do for Doctors?, 6 JOURN. OF FAMILY LAW, 371
(1966).
66 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) ; Goldman v. United States,
316 U.S. 129 (1942) ; On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) ; Lopez
v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S.
505 (1961) ; Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964) reversing Clinton v.
Commonwealth, 204 Va. 275 (1963).
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Court will now exclude evidence obtained through such means regard-
less of whether there has been a physical intrusion. The right of privacy
may also prevent searches in pursuance of administrative regulations,
heretofore exempted from the Fourth Amendment.6 7 However, the
Court has failed to hold that the Ninth Amendment right of privacy
may be invoked to curtail the use of informers."'
The right of privacy based upon the Ninth Amendment may be
applied to curtail the activities of certain governmental agencies as
recently exposed by Congressional investigations,6 9 from engaging in
such activities as mail covers which infringe on individual privacy. The
use of psychological testing and the conducting of surveys which in-
quire into the intimate details of the individual's life and thoughts may,
where extending beyond considerations of competency and efficiency,
be regarded as a deprivation of the right of privacy.70
Another aspect of the right of privacy is the right to travel. To the
extent an individual is denied the right to move about where he may
please, his privacy is infringed. The Court has recently failed to up-
hold the right to travel in affirming the denial of passports by the
State Department for travel to Cuba and other designated areas. 71 But
this case was decided under the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment and the speech provisions of the First Amendment. Another basis
for deciding these cases would be the right of privacy. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights recognizes the right to travel as a funda-
mental personal right. Article 13 provides:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and resi-
dence within the borders of each State.
2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including
his own, and to return to his country.
Clearly, the right of privacy, as premised upon the Ninth Amend-
ment, is an all encompassing constitutional right. This right, recognized
67 Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959) ; Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960).
68 Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) ; Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S.
206 (1966) ; Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966).60 Hearings before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Invasions of Privacy, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1965); Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee
on Government Operations, Special Inquiry on Invasions of Privacy, 89th
Cong. 1st Sess. (1965) ; Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Psychological Tests and
Constitutional Rights, 89th Cong. 1st Sess. (1965); Hearings before a Sub-
committee of the House Committee on Government Operations, Use of Poly-
graphs as "Lie Detectors" by the Federal Government, 88th Cong. 2d Sess.
1964; Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Govern-
ment Operations, The Computer and Invasion of Privacy, 89th Cong. 2d Sess.
1966. The problems regarding invasion of privacy is well summarized in Mr.
Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323
(1966).
70 Creech, The Privacy of Government Einployees, 31 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS.
413 (1966); Mirel, The Limits of Governmental Inquiry into the Lives of
Government Employees, 46 BosT. U. L. Rv. 1 (1966).
71Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
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in Talmudic and Roman Law, is essential for the existence of a free
society. It provides the "breathing space" for the operation of the
enumerated rights.7 2 The right of privacy, as expressed by the Court
in Griswold, accords significantly with Article 12 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights:
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon
his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the pro-
tection of the law against such interference or attacks. 73
Another right retained by the people is the right to political par-
ticipation when the Ninth Amendment is read within the context of
the speech provisions of the First Amendment, the voting provisions
of the Fifteenth Amendment, the decisions involving legislative ap-
portionment in relation to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the provision in Article 4, Section 4, that the Con-
gress guarantee each State a republican form of government.7 4 The
contention could be made that a State may not substitute another means
for the selection of a governor or legislator. The State may not impose
unreasonable qualifications for denying a candidate or political party
the right to appear on an election balloting or in striking a candidate
from the ballot. The right to political participation includes the right
of members of the public to have standing to be heard in matters of
administrative agency determination. Such a statutory right has been
recognized in regard to the renewal of a television station license by
the Federal Communications Commission and in the granting of a
right to erect a reservoir and power transmission lines by the Federal
Power Commission.
75
The right to political participation could be asserted to protect and
conserve natural resources. Mr. Justice Douglas has asserted that
people have a right to an environment that will not be offensive, harm-
ful, or even destructive of life and a right to have lakes and wilder-
ness areas protected from destruction."6 Such a right can be protected
through political participation by the general public who should have
72 Konvitz, Privacy and the Law: A Philosophical Prelude, 31 LAW AND CON-
TEMP. PRODS. 272, 277 (1966). The phrase, "breathing space," was used by
Mr. Justice Brennan in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
73 A/C. 3/SR 119, p. 9, discussed in ROBINSON, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS, 11 (1958).
7' Relevant precedents include Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Gray v.
Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
7 Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d. Cir. 1965)
cert. Den. 384 U.S. 941 (1966); Office of Communication of United Church
of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S.
116 (1966).
76 DOUGLAS, "THE BILL OF RIGHTS Is NOT ENOUGH" in Cahn, ed. THE GREAT
RIGHTS (Macmillan, 1963).
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standing to bring suit to enjoin public or private incursions upon
natural resources.
Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights embodies
the right of political participation:
1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of
his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
2. Everyone has the right of equal access to public service
in his country.
3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority
of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and
genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage
and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting
procedures. 77
Involved with the right to political participation is the right to have
access to information. Clearly the right to political participation, as
well as the exercise of free speech, cannot be effectively exercised with-
out knowledge of the facts involved with regard to a particular issue.
If an effective protest is to be made as to an administrative action,
there must be adequate notice. The individual has a right to notice of
pending government action and to the facts surrounding the given
situation which should be made easily accessible to him. Information
may be withheld where security or other policy considerations are
overriding.
Related to this right to information is the right to know as encom-
passed in academic and cultural freedom. A college professor or school
teacher has the right to pursue knowledge. The Court has recognized
that a professor need not be made answerable for his academic pursuits
to a governmental authority.78 Where a teacher is dismissed or disci-
plined because of his exercise of academic freedom, he should have a
judicial remedy to protect his constitutional rights. Academic freedom
also includes the right of a student or faculty group to invite any
speaker they may choose to speak on a college campus provided he
does not incite violence.
Another right retained by the people, to be derived from the Ninth
Amendment and the due process and equal protection clauses, is the
right to engage in a business or profession. The Court has abstained
from ruling on economic regulation under the equal protection and due
process clauses. But where regulations are imposed which have the
effect of depriving an individual from entering or engaging in a par-
ticular business or profession, a fundamental civil right is denied. The
legislature may adopt such regulations as the forbidding of women to
7 A/C.3/SR 130 p. 8. Discussed in Robinson, supra 131.78 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
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engage in bartending79 through pressures of particular interest groups."
Another right retained by the people in the context of modern in-
dustrial society is social and economic. Where once the right to prop-
erty was the basis of freedom, the right to social well being has become
basic. The Ninth Amendment may be read together with the due process
clause to establish a vested right to a pension. The right to social well
being, when coupled with the right to know-an aspect of the right
to political participation and the school segregation cases decided un-
der the equal protection clause of the Fourtenth Amendment-estab-
lishes a constitutional right to an education as an aspect of the right
to social well being.sl Where education facilities in one area are inade-
quate or unavailable, a child has the right to schooling in an adjacent
area with superior facilities.
To a great extent, the right to social well being can be implemented
by governmental agencies other than the judiciary. The Court cannot
improve the quality of schools, eradicate poverty, provide jobs, grant
better housing, or adequate medical care, or assure a minimum in-
come. Within this context, the Ninth Amendment is declaratory of a
right which can be secured by the legislative and executive branches
of government. But after the legislature has secured this right by pro-
viding the services, the Court may assure that the services are equit-
ably distributed. To the Court, the right to social well being means
that social services may not be distributed in a manner which infringes
upon fundamental human rights.
The right to social well being requires social planning by admin-
istrative agencies guided by policies laid down by the executive and
the legislature. The right of political participation will help in assuring
that planning and the allocations of resources will be made more dem-
ocratic, pluralistic, and egalitarian. But planning based on public in-
terest as determined by egalitarian majority decision making does not
assure protection for the individual. The law must draw a line beyond
which planning may not go, the starting point of which must be the
Bill of Rights. But these safeguards can be effective barriers only if
given a functional interpretation, and such a functional approach can
be found in the concept of privacy. As living becomes more crowded,
and government regulation becomes more pervasive, privacy is in-
creasingly threatened and requires the protection of law. The objective
is to keep the amount of privacy constant through changing circum-
stances and times. As Professor Reich asserts:
Planning must be halted at the line where belief, artistic
expression, domestic affairs, education, and creativity begin.
79 Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
so McClosky, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation
and Reburial, 1962 SUPREME COURT REV. 34.
Sa Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
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It is in meeting the need for an expanding Bill of Rights that
the most crucial function of the courts and of judicial review
is to be found. Courts cannot say what good planning is; at most
they can insist that procedures be followed, parties heard, values
mentioned and jurisdictional limits observed. But when planning
confronts the Bill of Rights the job of the courts is to see to it
that each right is equal to its task. In this sense, the courts may
expect an ever higher role and responsibility in the planned
society.8 2
It is in the protection of human rights, the area beyond planning, that
the distinctive quality of America lies in contrast to planning in Soviet
society.
Another right retained by the people is the right to treatment for
mental illness. In coupling the Ninth Amendment with the due process
clause the contention can be made that where an individual is confined
or committed to a hospital and is subjected only to custodial care with-
out receiving any treatment, he is, in effect, being restrained without
due process of law. By writ of habeas corpus, the Court should be per-
mitted to order that the patient be given treatment or released.
The rights enumerated in the Constitution apply to governmental
or state action. The concept of rights retained by the people as ex-
pressed in the Ninth Amendment could be construed to apply the Bill
of Rights to private action. Modern industrial society is characterized
by the emergence of pluralistic institutions-particularly, the labor
union and the corporation-which undertake important social func-
tions.8 3 These private institutions dispense social welfare and play a
vital role in providing services and regulating the life of the individual.
Where such institutions infringe upon fundamental rights, the individual
should have the protection of the Bill of Rights. An individual should
not be discharged from his employment or union membership sum-
marily or be subjected to psychological testing or interrogations in-
fringing upon his privacy. Private institutions should not be permitted
to discriminate in the housing or employment of individuals because
of their race or religion nor deprive individuals of their right to exer-
cise speech or religion.8 4
Since private institutions play a vital role in determining public
policy, the right to political participation should be extended to per-
mit members 'of the public to assert the public interest. If, for example,
a strike or lock-out occurs which adversely affects the public interest,
the members of the public should have standing to bring suit to protect
82 Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L. J. 1227, 1268 (1966).
83 BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION (Harcourt Brace, 1954);
HUTCHINS, THE Two FACES OF FEDERALISm (Fund of Republic, 1961).
84 Berle, Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity-Protection of Per-
sonal Rights froan Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REv.
933 (1952); Affeldt, The Labor Bill of Rights-Its Impact upon Personal
Rights, 37 DEr. L. J. 500 (1960).
1968]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
its rights. Similarly, where oligopolistic industries, such as steel, raise
prices arbitrarily, the public should have a right to compel a public
hearing.
In some instances, such as in providing for the equal rights of all
citizens, the rights retained by the people may be secured by the state
or federal government through such legislation as providing for open
occupancy or fair employment. In upholding the constitutionality of
the Colorado fair housing statute, the Colorado Supreme Court stated:
We have no hesitancy in stating that there are fundamental
and inherent rights with which all humans are endowed even
though no specific mention is made of them in either the national
or state constitution .... Are not the Ninth and Tenth Amend-
ments authority for state legislation to define and secure inherent
reasonable expectations in life, in civilized society as it is today
and is not the Ninth Amendment a challenge to the state to un-
dertake that work as the condition of American life today may
demand it.85
Conclusion
With the decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, the Ninth Amend-
ment has emerged as rule of construction to interpret the rights speci-
fied in the Constitution within the context of present day needs and
values. The unenumerated "other" rights which are retained by the
people serve to make the Bill of Rights more functional. The right of
privacy and the right of political participation are essential for the
functioning of a free and open society. These concepts enable the en-
compassing of those rights which are embodied in the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights and serve the function of assuring indi-
vidual freedom in a planned society.
The notion of rights retained by the people can be applied to assure
protection from infringement of fundamental human rights by the pri-
vate sector of our economy. The Ninth Amendment not only provides
a guide for judicial action but is also an injunction upon the legislative
and the executive at both the Federal and State levels to secure the
rights of the individual by positive action.
ss Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission v. Case, 151 Colo. 235, 380 p. 2d
34 (1962).
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